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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
U.C.A. 41-6-44: (1) 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
2 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii)has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation or actual physical control. . . . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The State claims: 
(1) Utah Case law holds that an inoperable vehicle is a vehicle over which a 
person can be in 'actual physical control' for the purposed of the DUI statute. 
(2) Defendant cannot claim error where the defendant reportedly invited error, in 
that; the defendant did not properly preserve his objection to the Court's 
failure to given his requested jury instruction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1-Utah's DUI statute specifically mandates that the vehicle driven be an 
operable motor vehicle. Here the vehicle was inoperable. The State stipulated at trial that 
they had no proof, at trial, that they had any evidence to suggest he was impaired at the 
time of the driving. The State argues that since the defendant drove the car where it 
became inoperable it is enough. This is contrary to the case holdings of Utah. 
2 
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2- The State argues that defendant invited error. The State's argument is 
based on a portion of the transcript which is taken out of context. Once the entire text is 
given, it is clear that the defendant did not invite error. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
State's Position. 
Utah Case law holds that an inoperable vehicle is a vehicle over which a person 
can be in 'actual physical control'for the purposed of the Dili statute. 
Defendant's Position. 
The State stipulated, at trial, that they had no proof that the defendant drove the 
car off the road while under the influence of alcohol They relied on the fact that by 
driving, the now inoperable ca,r to its resting place, an inference can be made that he { 
was impaired without further proof Defendant asserts that if the State is to rely on this 
inference they must offer some proof to substantiate this inference of impairment. 
i 
Here, no evidence suggested that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol 
at the time he drove the car off the road. None. The State, in their brief, cites a transcript { 
reference to circumstantial evidence suggesting that the defendant was under the 
influence at this time. Appellant cannot find such. Further, this suggestion contradicts 
3 , 
the State's position at trial. At trial, the State stipulated they could not prove he to be 
under the influence when the car went into the gorge. 
Appellant cites this court to the following discussion at trial between the 
defense, State, and the trial court. 
A discussion dealing with the application of Lopez v. Schwendiman 
occurred on record. The trial court commented that we do not know the 
particular factual scenario of Lopez in that, we don't know if he was drunk 
when he drove the car to the location where it was inoperable. The Court stated 
at page 99 line 20: 
The Court: So we know he was drunk when he was apprehended at the truck. 
What we don't know in the facts oj: Lopez is if he was drunk when the tracks were 
made. That's the point. 
The State responded at page 99 line 24 stating: 
Mr. Probert: Right And we don't know that here either. 
The Court: Right. 
Mr. Carter: And our statute requires he's actual physical control while he's under 
the influence. 
The trial court, the defense, and the State all agreed that the proof was lacking. No 
proof existed as to his state of sobriety at the time of the alleged driving. This is based 
on the following evidence. 
The officer under cross-examination stated: {Starting at page 84 Line 20) 
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Q. There was going to be some independent means applied to that vehicle 
to get it to move. 
A. (Officer Mitchell). Yes. From where it was sitting. 
Q. And you don't' know the extent of what that might have been. 
A. The extent it might have been was, help was called. A single person 
showed up. And the occupant was waiting with the vehicle. 
Q. Do you know how long that Blazer had been there? 
A. I don't 
Q. You obviously didn't observe the vehicle going into that area where 
it came to rest. 
A. No. 
Q. Pretty much your observations are limited to the time at 9:15 p.m. when 
you arrived at the scene to the time of the arrest at 9:50 p.m. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't have any other observations before that time of 9:50 p.m. 
A. Just a dispatch that said there was a car that went off and an accident. 
Q. We don't have a third party giving us any more information at all. 
A. I know where you're leading. No. I tried to find out if there was a 
complainant that called it in, information. There wasn't. 
Q. You see Mr. Hutchings at that time. You say he doesn't have alcohol 
coming from his breath. 
A. No. 
Q. You say it comes from his clothing or his perspiration or something of 
that nature. 
A. Off his person, yes. 
Q. Correct. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know how much alcohol Mr. Hutchings had to drink? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know how much alcohol he had before he arrived on the 
scene? 
. A. No. 
Q. You don't know how long he had been there? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't know how the vehicle got there? 
A. Just by the tracks, missed the curve and went over. 
Q. The only thing you know is, he's about the vehicle? 
A. He's in the driver seat in a vehicle. ( Transcript Page 87 Line 13) 
. . . (Transcript 83 Line 15) 
Q. It wasn 't going to move on its own volition or on movement? You 
couldn 't urn the key, start it up, and drive it off? 
a. No, you could not. (Line 18.) 
The tow truck driver arrived and tried to start the car. 
(Transcript Page 60 Line 14) 
Q. What happened when he tried to start the vehicle? 
A. It wouldn 't start. 
Q. Who removed the vehicle from the scene? 
A. The tow company. 
The defendant's position is based on Utah statutory law, which requires the car be 
operable. The trial court defined a motor vehicle to be a self-propelled vehicle intended 
primarily for use and operation on the highways. See Court's Instruction 5. This 
instruction is based on Utah law and was submitted to the trial court via jury instruction 
by the defense. (Contrary to the State ys position in their brief the defendant hadpre-
filed his requested jury instruction with the trial court. The trial court even modified 
their initial instruction to conform to defendant's statement of the law. See transcript at 
page 95.) 
Utah statutory law (U.C.A. 41-6-1 (22)) defines a 'motor vehicle" as: 
. . .every vehicle which is self propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by 
electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, 
except vehicles moved solely by human power and motorized wheel chairs. 
U.C.A. 41-6-1 (55) defines a vehicle to be: 
. . .every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be 
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transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon 
stationary rails or tracks. 
In contradiction to this statutory language, the State seeks support in the Lopez v. 
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986). Lopez is not a criminal case but an 
appeal from driver license suspension. As noted by the trial court, the factual scenario of 
Lopez is lacking. However, the language target by the State in Lopez is: 
Where, as here, circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that the 
car was where it was and was performing as it was because of the defendant }s 
choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical control. 
The language suggests that since the defendant had driven the car to that location 
there is a legitimate inference that may be drawn. See also Richfield City v. Walker, 790 
P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990). 
Here, the evidence is lacking — no evidence supports a legitimate 
inference that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he drove into the gorge. 
The State of Utah even conceded this point as noted above. Defendant argues 
that these stipulation are binding. 
The problem with the State's theory was noted by the trial court. The 
Court commented at page 102 line 9. 
The Court: Well, the problem I have with your argument, Mr. Probert, is that if I 
have a derelict motor vehicle sitting in a wrecking yard, hasn't been operated since 
memory of man, and a drunk stumbles in and sits down in the seat, under your 
argument, he would be in physical control of a motor vehicle. I'm not willing to go 
that far. 
7 i 
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Defendant's position is similar to the trial court. The State must make some 
correlation to the actual driving of the vehicle (which is now inoperable) and the 
defendant's state of impairment. The scenario presented by the trial court is one problem. 
Many others exist. 
What if, as here, the vehicle is in a location for an unknown time maybe even up 
to a number of days. The defendant returns to the inoperable car to have a two truck pull it 
away. But in the interim, he has drank to excess and slides behind the wheel. Is the person 
then guilty of the DUI? 
What if two persons were in the car when it was driven off the road. The 
passenger is intoxicated but the driver not. The car is determined to be inoperable from thi 
accident. The passenger slides behind the wheel as the officer arrives. 
The State has some burden to prove that when he drove off into the gorge, he 
was impaired by alcohol. Here the time the car drove off the road is unknown (hours or 
days). The defendant's state of impairment is unknown No effort was made to correlate 
the defendant's state of impairment when this accident (driving) occurred. The quantity of 
alcohol consumed after the defendant was cut off and drove into the gorge is unknown. 
The State carries the burden of proof. If they are going to rely on the defendant 
driving to the location, they need give some evidence to support a legitimate inference 
that he did so while impaired. If the defendant was observed by the officer within 
8 
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minutes of the accident, it may be a legitimate inference that he drove there while 
impaired. 
Here, the State however failed to give us any evidence to substantiate a legitimate 
inference that when the defendant drove off the road he was impaired. 
State's Claim- Defendant invited error. 
Defendant submitted his requested instruction with supporting memorandum. The 
State also submitted their own jury instruction, which is almost identical to defendants. 
See "Memorandum in Reference to Defendant's Requested Instruction."—Submitted July 
16, 2002 twenty days prior to trial. The trial court decided to draft its own version Yet, 
somehow the State argues that the defendant invited error. 
Defense Position: 
The defendant had submitted his written jury instructions almost three (3) weeks 
prior to trial. The Court informed counsel that the Court had drafted its own jury 
instruction on 'actual physical control'. The defense thereafter sought modifications of 
the Court's given instruction to enhance his defense theory without success, This does not 
constitute 'inviting error.' 
9 
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Defendant objected to the Court's given instruction throughout the trial court's 
discussion. Defendant particularized his objection to the Court's instruction 
contemporaneous with his motion to dismiss. Seepage 92 line 4-10. The Court had 
informed the parties that the Court was going to use its own instruction and not theirs. 
See Page 91 line 2. Further, contrary to the provisions of Rule 19 (e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the trial court did not provide an opportunity to express objections 
but simply advised that the Court would give the Court's instruction thereby rejecting the 
defendant's and State's. 
The trial court then asked for input referencing the 'actual physical 
control' instruction given by the trial court. Page 97 line 2. The State here 
argues that defense counsel's objection was inviting error. 
The defense stated referencing the Court's given instruction: 
Mr. Carter: If they're going to rely upon the driver before the vehicle 
becomes inoperable, they're required to show some connection at that time 
to the defendant's intoxication. . . . 
Page 97 line 17-20. 
Mr. Carter: That's my point. There's no correlation here. We're limited 
on our findings regarding time sequence. We're limited on our alcohol 
consumption sequence. We don't have any connection to the actual 
driving. From my argument, they can't convict him of actual physical 
control sitting as the officer finds him. They have to use the statement 
before to surmise that maybe he was intoxicated at that time. Page 99 
line 5-1L 
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Mr. Carter: My argument is, that's the essence of the statute. You've got 
to have both. As you said in your (State's) opening argument, you have 
to do the dot to dot. Page 100 line 18-20. 
Court: . . . Again, we're inferring. We're reading between the lines. What 
they're saying there is, they don't want to allow a drunken driver who 
wrecks his car to then not be able to be convicted because he wrecked the 
car. Page 101 line 4-7. 
Mr. Carter. And we agree. Page 101 line 8. 
Further discussion continues and the Court decides to move on and then 
asks for input on other instructions. Seepage 103 lines 1 -3. Mr. Carter then 
advises that the defendant had not elected to testify or not at this point. Page 103 
line 4. The State wants to discuss further the 'actual physical control' instruction 
and the Court advises that the Court has already ruled and wants to move on. 
Page 103 line 12. The State persists and now wants to include hypertechnical 
verbiage. Page 103 line 14-16. The Court then asks defense if they have any 
objection to this technical addition and the defense states "No. That's fine." Page 
103 line 25. 
Defense counsel, although specifically proposing his version of 'actual 
physical control' was advised by the Court that it would not be given and the 
Court had drafted a different instruction and ask counsel's input. Defendant did 
not waive his objection. However, the defense did try, without success, to have 
the Court's given instruction modified. 
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The State had argued that the defense instruction had raised a list of factors to be 
considered as set out in Richfield City v. Walker, supra. The State sought to argue that 
further additional indicators should be added to the list set out in Walker. 
Defense counsel suggested that he desired the Walker list be given as per his 
instruction but recognized that the Court had already ruled. Defense counsel stated: 
. . .Walker just gave you a nine and didn't say it was a full list anyway. You know, 
I wouldn't mind see Walker in there. But I think the court has ruled. Let's move 
on. Page 104 Line 19. 
The trial court then commented on the issue of a checklist advising that the Court 
was going to avoid giving a checklist and wanted to look at the 'totality of the 
circumstances'. Page 104 Line 23. 
The State argues that counsel invited error. Appellant disagrees. 
The State argues: 
"After deciding that issue, the trial court asked, "Is there anything further we 
need to discuss on this instruction? " (R. 154:103) Defendant responded, " I don't 
think I have a problem with anything else " (R. 154:103) ". Seepage 15 of State's 
Brief 
The State misleads. This phrase noted immediately above is taken out of 
context. The State fails to report the entire text. In full, it reads: 
Court:.. • Is there anything further that we need to discuss on this 
instruction? Is there any argument or question about any of the other 
instructions? 
Mr. Carter: We haven't elected at this point whether the defendant is 
going to testify. Want that to be optional. I don't think I have a problem 
12 
with anything else. (Emphasis Added indicated sentences eliminated by the 
State in their brief) 
Once read within in the entire text in full, it is clear that the Court asked for some 
input on other instructions. The defendant advised that the instruction dealing with the 
defendant testifying or not maybe unnecessary since the defendant may not testify at all— 
he had not decided. Then the defense notes no other difficulties with any other 
instructions. 
MANIFEST ERROR 
Further, it does not matter. It is 'manifest error' not to define the elements of the 
offense. Here, the Court refused both the State's and defense's instruction and created its 
own. The Court here failed to follow the applicable case law in defining 'actual physical 
control' and chooses to go alone. 
In State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991) the Court pronounced: 
The jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal elements that it must find 
to convict of the crime charged, and the absence of such an instruction is 
reversible error as a matter of law. Laine, 618 P.2d at 35. In State v. Roberts, 711 
P.2d 235 (Utah 1985), we stated, 'The general rule is that an accurate instruction 
upon the basic elements of an offense is essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes 
reversible error." Id. at 239 (Utah 1985) (citing Laine, 618 P.2d at 35). See also 
State v. Harmon, 712P.2d291, 292 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. Reedy, 681 
P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1984). Thus, the failure to give this instruction can never 
be harmless error. 
The complete absence of an elements instruction on a crime 
charged is an error we review to avoid manifest injustice. See 
Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c); State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 
1983); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 
1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 
60 P.2d 952, 958-59 (1936); People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal.3d 307, 
13 
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650 P.2d 311, 326-27, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 451-52 (1982) (en 
banc). Cf. State v. Bell, 563P.2dl86, 187 (Utah 1977). It 
follows that even though Jones failed to object to the lack of an 
elements instruction when the instructions were given, the trial 
court's complete failure to give an elements instruction on 
aggravated kidnapping is clear error and requires reversal of the 
conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge. 
Here, the trial court failed to advise the jury of the legal definition of 'actual 
physical control'. It is the essential elements of this offense. 
As set out in State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), the test of whether an 
unpreserved objection may be reviewed under the 'manifest injustice ' exception is as 
follows: 
. . . First, the error must be "plain" or "manifest." This is sometimes termed an 
"obviousness" requirement. After examining the record, an appellate court must be 
able to say "that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing 
error." Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the 
substantial rights of a party. In other words, applying the standard we explained in 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d at 919, the appellant must show a reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error, the outcome below would have been more favorable. 
Here, the trial court chooses to create its own instruction and deviate from 
established precedent. The error is obvious. There was a conscious choice to avoid 
precedent as acknowledged by instructions submitted by both the State and defense. 
Further, the defense argues that a different result would have occurred if the Court 
would have submitted the instructions tendered by the defense. Under the formula of 
Richfield City v. Walker, supra, a person should have the apparent ability to move the 
14 
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vehicle. There would be no danger of the defendant driving the car since it could not be 
moved. Absent such a showing, the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal. 
CONCLUSION 
The States failure to correlate the defendant's driving to a state of impairment is 
fatal. If the State is to rely on a legitimate inference, they must tender some evidence to 
support such an inference. Here, they did not do so. 
Secondly, once the defendant's comments are read in full text, it is obvious that he 
did not invite error. The trial court had refused to give his instruction which represented 
•1 
years of case precedent and created its own. The trial court's instruction failed to define 
the offense of being in 'actual physical control of the car while impaired'. 
Dated this 2 N D day of August, 2003. 
15 ( 
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Addendum to Brief 
1. Portions of the transcript with highlights. 
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A. Like I said, I've been policing for so long that when 
1 get a circumstance such as this or somebody calls for help 
and it's not a tow truck and they say there's no damage to the 
vehicle, my attitude is that that vehicle can move. It might 
be out of gas. There's some reason. It might be a temporary 
thing. It might be a permanent thing. The occupant of the 
vehicle said there was no damage to the vehicle. When he 
called somebody to pull him out, the vehicle was going to move 
when somebody came there, either with a tow strap •- he stayed 
with the vehicle, and the vehicle was going to move from that 
spot without a tow truck. 
Q. Eventually at some time? 
A. Without a tow truck because it was never called 
except by me. 
Q. You and I aren't going to argue about semantics. 
Someone might have called the tow truck and pulled it out 
independent of your call, correct? 
A. The fact of the matter is, he called his father to 
come and help him. 
Q. There was going to be some independent means applied 
to that vehicle to get it to move. 
A. Yes. From where it was sitting. 
Q. And you just don't know the extent of what that might 
have been. 
A. The extent it might have been was, help was called. 
A single person showed up. And the occupant was waiting with 
the vehicle. 
Q. We're conjecturing what might or might not have been. 
A. Actually, his father did show up on scene, and the 
single person as occupant was waiting for his help to arrive. 
Q. Did you check out any further what was wrong with 
that vehicle? 
A. No, based on the occupant saying there was no damage 
to the vehicle. 
Q. Do you remember when we had our conversation before 
at a hearing where you advised me that the vehicle was 
inoperable; it was not going to be moved? 
A. I said it wouldn't start, if I remember right, on the 
pretrial. 
Q. Prelim. 
A. It didn't start. I think the question was, the tow 
truck came and got it, and the semantic was that I called the 
tow truck and not the occupant. 
Q. Do you know how long that Blazer had been there? 
A. I don't. 
Q. You obviously didn't observe the vehicle going into 
that area where it came to rest. 
A. No. j 
Q. Pretty much your observations are limited to the time | 
at 9:15 p.m. when you arrived at the scene to the time of the 
84 85 
1 I arrest, about 9:50 p.m. 
2 A. Yes. 
3 I Q. You just don't have any other observations before 
4 that t ime of 9:50 p.m.? 
5 J A. just a dispatch that said there was a car that went 
6 off and an accident. 
7 Q. We don't have a third party giving us any more 
8 information at all? 
9 A. I know where you're leading. No. I tried to find 
10 out if there was a complainant that called it in, information. 
11 There wasn't. 
12 Q. You see Mr. Hutchings at that time. You say he 
13 doesn't have alcohol coming from his breath. 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. You say it comes from his clothing or his 
16 perspiration or something of that nature. 
17 A. Off his person, yes. 
18 Q- Correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do you know if any alcohol was spilled on him or 
21 anything of that nature? 
22 A. There's a difference between fresh alcohol and 
23 consumed alcohol. Over the years, it's pretty prevalent when 
24 somebody has been drinking and they breathe on you. You ca 
25 smell it on their breath versus coming off their body. If 
it's spilled on them, it's a different smell. 
Q. Do you know how much alcohol Mr. Hutchings had to 
drink? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know how much alcohol he had before you 
arrived on the scene? 
No. 
Q. You don't know how long he had been there? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't know how the vehicle got there? 
A. Just by the tracks. Missed the curve and went over. 
Q. The only thing you know is, he's about a vehicle -
A. He's in the driver's seat in a vehicle. 
Q. Keys are on the passenger's side? 
A. Passenger's front seat. 
Q. The vehicle will not start? 
A. I only knew that after the tow truck came. 
Q. And it's going to require some independent means, a 
third party, to help it move some direction or whatever. 
A. Before I called for the tow truck, yeah, he told me 
that he had walked off and actually called his father to come 
and help him. 
MR. CARTER: Nothing further. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Probert? 
86 87 
this physical control instruction? 
MR. CARTER: That would be fine, Judge, but I'd like 
to do something on the record. I'd like to move for a 
dismissal at this point. I don't think the State has shown my 
client to be in actual physical control. I have actually 
formalized it by this memo, if I may approach. I faxed a copy 
of that to Mr. Probert this morning. I believe he has it. 
For the Court's information, I think it just basically resets 
out my arguments on the instructions as well. I don't think 
it adds a lot. 
THE: COURT: Your argument is that if the car wouldn't 
go, it couldn't be physically controlled? 
MR. CARTER: Keys are out of the ignition, on the 
passenger's side. He's behind the wheel of an inoperable 
vehicle. We do not think that fits within the definition of 
actual physical control. 
Just for purposes of the record, on the issue of your 
ruling on the corpus delecti, at that time I thought there was 
only identification of the vehicle being down there; there 
wasn't any information relayed regarding the driving. The 
only relationship to driving was the defendant's comments as 
reported by the officer that some lady cut him off and forced 
him down into that area. 
THE COURT: Just to respond to that, I was satisfied 
that there was enough of an inference. Doesn't have to be 
1 proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I've got a vehicle, tracks, 
2 off the road, someone who appears to be impaired. I'm 
3 satisfied there's enough. 
4 Mr. Probert, response to his motion to dismiss? 
5 MR. PROBERT: Yes, Your Honor. The State would argue 
6 that the law in the state of Utah is as described in the 
7 decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Lopez versus 
8 Schwendiman, which adopted the decision in State versus 
9 Smelter, the Washington Supreme Court decision. I would like 
10 to just read a short quotation from Lopez: 
11 "Utah's statute provides for the arrest of one 'in 
12 actual physical control' of the vehicle while under the 
13 influence of alcohol and/or drugs. That requirement was 
14 intended by our legislature to protect public safety and 
15 apprehend the drunken driver before he or she strikes and may 
16 not be construed to exclude those whose vehicles are presently 
17 immobile because of mechanical trouble." That's page 791 of 
18 the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in relation to that 
19 case. 
20 THE COURT: That's in Lopez? 
21 MR. PROBERT: That's Lopez. I do have a photostat 
22 copy of that case if Your Honor wants to look at it. 
23 THE COURT: I have it in front of me. 
24 MR. PROBERT: In that case, Your Honor is aware of 
25 the factual situation, and I think that the factual situation 
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is strongly paralleled in this case. In State versus Smelter, 
the Court said that, "The focus should not be narrowly upon 
the mechanical condition of the car when it comes to rest" --
clearly, here we have a vehicle that came to rest •- "but upon 
the status of its occupant and the nature of the authority he 
or she exerted over the vehicle in arriving at the place from 
which, by virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move." 
Then the Court went on: "Where, as here, circumstantial 
evidence permits a legitimate inference that the car was where 
it was and was performing as it was because of the defendant's 
choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical 
control." 
The State would argue that the fact that the vehicle 
was inoperable is rendered irrelevant by the decisions in 
Lopez versus Schwendiman and State versus Smelter. The fact 
that the vehicle is inoperable is not a consideration which 
the supreme court has indicated is to be taken into 
consideration, as I understand the decision in Lopez. The 
statute "may not be construed to exclude those whose vehicles 
are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble." 
The State would submit it on that basis. 
THE COURT: Mr. Carter, want to be heard further? 
MR. CARTER: I assume the Court has read my briefs. 
I differ with that argument. 
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss. 
I think the Lopez case is almost directly on point. That's a 
case with an immobile vehicle with tracks leading to the 
vehicle. Lopez was presumably convicted. Although it wasn't 
a criminal case, it was an appeal of the denial of a driver's 
license or whatever. The rule of law is the same, although 
the burden of proof is different. I think it's pretty close 
to on point. I'm going to deny the motion. 
Now what I had done on the physical control statute. 
First of all, if you've got your instructions, if you'll take 
a look at page 5 of 25 of the instructions, I put in a 
definition of motor vehicle. I did it late in the day, and I 
took it from the wrong chapter. Mr. Carter has submitted a 
definition of motor vehicle which is from the correct chapter. 
MR. CARTER: Wait a minute. I want to hear that 
again. 
THE COURT: You submitted the one from the correct 
chapter. 
MR. CARTER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: But unless this is a trolley car, you had 
a lot of language there that didn't really apply. I think 
what's happened is, the definition 1 took is from 41-1, and 
the one you took is from 41-6. They talk about applying to 
chapters. There's a lot of language in the 41-6 one that 
doesn't apply in the case. The principle difference is -• 
they both talk about a self-propelled vehicle. ! think the 
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41- l (a) definition then talks about intended for use and 
operation on a road. That's the instruction I used. And I 
think the one that's later doesn't say that. It just says any 
self-propelled vehicle. 
Candidly, I have a problem with that definition. 
It's not in this case, but, I mean, what about these kids that 
are rodding around on these skateboards with a little motor on 
them? Under the one section, it's a motor vehicle. Under the 
other, it isn ' t I don't think anybody in their right mind is 
going to be putting on the blue lights and trying to chase 
down a kid on a skateboard. Doesn't apply to this case. 
MR. CARTER: Let me clear that up for you. 
THE COURT: Doesn't apply to this case. I think what 
you're concerned about, Mr. Carter, is, you're able to argue 
it's not a vehicle because it's not self-propelled. Is that 
fair? 
MR. CARTER: That may be where I'm going. 
THE COURT: I think that language is the same in 
either case. 
MR. CARTER: I don't think either one hurts me. I 
think this is fine. 
THE COURT: Are you comfortable with this definition? 
MR. PROBERT: I'm comfortable with the incorrect 
definition. 
THE COURT: It's a vehicle so it fits either one. 
MR. PROBERT: Yes. 
THE COURT: The next instruction is page 6 of 25. 
That's the physical control. I'll tell you, the genesis of 
this instruction is that this is essentially the instruction 
that will be included in the model criminal instructions for 
Utah. They haven't been published yet, but I have a set. 
They're out for comment right now. With the exception that I 
added in the last paragraph, the last paragraph comes directly 
from the Lopez case. 
MR. PROBERT: It comes from the Smelter case. 
THE COURT: Smelter as cited in Lopez. The portion 
that Mr. Probert read to us, the quote that Mr. Probert read 
to us, from Lopez is the following paragraph. What I did is 
took it right out of the case. It's my view that the supreme 
court adopted that by approval. But I'll hear you as to how 
you think it ought to be worded. 
MR. CARTER: If they're going to rely upon the 
driving before the vehicle becomes inoperable, they're 
required to show some connection at that t ime to the 
defendant's intoxication. I think you have a reference in 
that to that instruction, but it's not real clear. I think it 
ought to be more clear. If they're going to rely on some 
driving beforehand, then they need to correlate the 
intoxication to the previous driving. 
THE COURT: You're talking about a situation where. 
96 97 
as a hypothetical, subject drives a car down the road; he's 
involved in an accident; car becomes disabled; he then begins 
to drink, so that the intoxication occurs thereafter. The 
question is, under the language of Smelter and of Lopez, is he 
nevertheless guilty under that language because what this case 
says is that if it's inoperable because of his control, it's 
irrelevant? That's Mr. Probert's argument, I think, that 
under that circumstance, if he's in physical control of the 
hunk of junk, if that's what it is once it becomes inoperable, 
but he's in control of whatever used to be a vehicle, and it 
used to be a vehicle, under my hypothetical, because he 
wrecked it. 
Your argument is, if the intoxication occurred 
thereafter, he can't be under physical control while 
intoxicated. I think Mr. Probert's argument is, it doesn't 
matter. He caused it to become inoperable. Therefore, he 
remains in physical control of it. And if the intoxication 
and the physical control coincide, there's a violation. 
Is that fairly stated? 
MR, PROBERT: That's correct, Judge. And, of course, 
the supreme court in Lopez versus Schwendiman raised the very 
issue that if the defendant has rendered the vehicle 
inoperable in a collision, he's not allowed to escape the 
prosecution for DUI. 
THE COURT: They raised it. The dilemma they have 
is, we don't have enough facts to know if it was dicta or the 
facts of the case because we don't know if there was a 
correlation between the time of intoxication and the time of 
control in Lopez. 
MR. CARTER: That's my point. There's no correlation 
here. We're l imited on our findings regarding time sequence. 
We're limited on our alcohol consumption sequence. We don't 
have any connection to the actual driving. From my argument, 
they can't convict him of actual physical control sitting as 
the officer finds him. They have to use the statement before 
to surmise that maybe he was intoxicated at that time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Probert, do you want to be heard 
further? 
MR. PROBERT: If I could direct you to Paragraph 6 in 
Lopez, the Court there says, "The trial court here found that 
there were tire tracks leading up to the vehicle, that the 
vehicle had to have reached its point of rest 'apparently on 
its own power,' and that Lopez had failed the field sobriety 
tests." 
THE COURT: So we know he was drunk when he was 
apprehended at the truck. What we don't know in the facts of 
Lopez is if he was drunk when the tracks were made. That's 
the point. 
MR. PROBERT: Right. And we don't know that here 
either. 
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THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CARTER: And our statute requires he's actual 
physical control while he's under the influence. 
THE COURT: Well, he's in physical control if it's 
not necessary that the vehicle be operable in order for him to 
be physical control. What I'm wondering about is the language 
that I put in this instruction that says, "It is also possible 
for a person to be in physical control of a motor vehicle when 
the vehicle is disabled if the problem from the vehicle arose 
from the act or behavior of the actor" - that's right out of 
Smelter -- "and the jury can conclude that the disabling 
action is contemporaneous with the intoxication of the 
Defendant." That phrase is something I added. I presume you 
object to that, Mr. Probert; is that correct? 
MR. PROBERT: Yes, I do, because that seems to put a 
burden on the State to -• seems to be creating an element of 
the offense which is not in the statute. 
MR. CARTER: My argument is, that's the essence of 
the statute. You've got to have both. As you said in your 
opening argument, you have to do the dot to dot. 
THE COURT: I'm looking directly at the quote from 
Smelter. What it says is, "Where, as here, circumstantial 
evidence permits a legitimate inference that the car was where 
it was and was performing as it was because of the defendant's 
choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical 
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control. To hold otherwise could conceivably allow an 
intoxicated driver whose vehicle was rendered inoperable in a 
collision to escape prosecution." 
Again, we're inferring. We're reading between the 
lines. What they're saying there is, they don't want to allow 
a drunken driver who wrecks his car to then not be able to be 
convicted because he wrecked his car. 
MR. CARTER: And we agree. 
THE COURT: And I think that's what it says. So I'm 
going to leave the phrase that I have added in, and that is 
that you've got to show that the intoxication is reasonably 
contemporaneous with his disabling of the car, although the 
fact that the car is there after being disabled does not make 
it impossible for him to be convicted. So there's evidence 
here from which it's very possible for this jury to conclude 
that he was driving the car when it went off the road. 
There's no evidence at all -- we don't know why the car was 
disabled, although we know that it was; he was in it; and the 
tow truck driver couldn't start it. That's all the evidence 
shows. 
MR. PROBERT: Could I say something? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. PROBERT: Judge, in the hypothetical scenario 
that the defendant in this situation goes away and drinks a 
considerable amount of alcohol after he has wrecked the 
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vehicle and comes back and is sitting in the driver's seat 
with the keys, the vehicle is inoperable. If the vehicle had 
been just flooded and was unable to be operated because he had 
tried too hard and had flooded the engine so it wouldn't go, 
when he came back, by that t ime, he was intoxicated. The 
statute is designed to stop him from driving off in that 
vehicle. The fact that the vehicle is inoperable does not 
make him not liable. 
THE COURT: Weil, the problem I have with your 
argument, Mr. Probert, is that if I have a derelict motor 
vehicle sitt ing in a wrecking yard, hasn't been operated since 
memory of man, and a drunk stumbles in and sits down in the 
seat, under your argument, he would be in physical control of 
a motor vehicle. I'm not willing to go that far. 
MR. PROBERT: Well, I don't think you have to go that 
far. 
THE COURT: I think you have to show that the car is 
disabled because of his agency. And it makes no sense unless 
the intoxication is also contemporaneous with that behavior. 
MR. PROBERT: Well, would Your Honor tell me whether 
the person in the scenario that I have created is liable under 
the DUI statute? He's sitting in the vehicle. He has the 
keys. He's intoxicated. 
THE COURT: No, i won't answer the question because 
it's not the facts before us. 
Is there anything further that we need to discuss on 
this instruction? Is there any argument or question about any 
of the other instructions? 
MR. CARTER: We haven't elected at this point whether 
the defendant is going to testify. Want that to be optional. 
I don't think I have a problem with anything else. 
THE COURT: I've given the horizontal gaze nystagmus 
instruction, which I think is approved by the supreme court. 
Mr. Probert, any other questions? 
MR. PROBERT: I did, Judge, in relation to the 
instruction that we've been discussing. 
THE COURT: I've ruled. I don't intend to take 
further argument on it. Let's move on. 
MR. PROBERT: Well, there seems to be some words ieft 
out. I'm sorry to ask you about this. In the first sentence, 
I think you've left out the words "while under the influence." 
MR. CARTER: That's a super-hypertechnical reading of 
it. To me, it's not a big deal. I think the essence of it is 
clear. 
THE COURT: You want to add the words "under the 
influence" after the word "individual?" 
MR. PROBERT: Of alcohol and/or drugs or of alcohol, 
if you prefer. 
THE COURT; You object to that, Mr. Carter? 
MR. CARTER: No. That's fine. 
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MR. PROBERT: I also had another point which I hadn* 
been able to address at this point 
THE COURT: Let me finish this. Just a minute. 
MR. PROBERT: Mr. Carter raised the question of City 
of Richfield versus Walker, and he mentioned the factors that 
are mentioned in that case as being relevant factors to the 
discussion of whether or not somebody is in actual physical 
control. In this instruction, it talks about three factors 
which the jury may consider. There are other factors which 
were specifically mentioned in Walker, such as how the vehicle 
got to the spot where it was, which are not mentioned there. 
This seems to me to be a rather vague statement of what the 
jury is supposed to do with the information when it says it 
may consider whether the defendant occupied the driver's 
position. That just seems to me that it doesn't cover all the 
conditions. It doesn't say whether or not any of these is 
determinative or whether it is a fullness of the factors which 
are relevant. 
MR. CARTER: Walker just gave you a nine and didn't 
say it was a full list anyway. You know, I wouldn't mind 
seeing Walker in there. But I think the Court has ruled. 
Let's move on. 
THE COURT: Well, the problem we have is and what I' 
going to avoid doing is creating a checklist because the law 
is clear that they're to consider the totality of the 
circumstances. I didn't draft this language. This is the 
model instruction that's been prepared and to be approved in 
ail courts in the state. The reason it's drafted somewhat 
vague is because it's a totality-of-the-circumstances test. 
They don't need to go through and check off each item. 
But having said that, in the second paragraph after 
where it says "you may consider," if I added the words "the 
totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to," 
would that satisfy? Then you can argue whatever circumstances 
you think there are in this case that justify the appropriate 
conclusion. 
MR. PROBERT: I would ask Your Honor to include the 
words "how the vehicle got there." 
MR. CARTER: That's very well addressed below, Judge. 
THE COURT: I think it's addressed below. 
Mr. Carter, anything further? You object to that 
verbiage? 
MR. CARTER: No. 
THE COURT: Other objections? 
MR. PROBERT: I have one other instruction that I ask 
the Court to include which the Court has not included. The 
State submits that there should be some instruction in the 
instructions to the jury about the refusal to submit to a 
test. 
THE COURT: You get to mention it. Do you want me to 
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emphasize it? I think you can argue it. Why do you need an 
instruction? 
MR. PROBERT: Well, ! think that the jury may wonder 
what the significance of that is and what they're able to do 
with that information, that he refused the test. 
THE COURT: Is there a legal significance? 
MR. PROBERT: Well, I suppose the information has 
already been before the jury. 
THE COURT: It's a factual conclusion, and the 
evidence has been presented to them. You can argue it. You 
can have them infer whatever they think they should infer or 
should appropriately infer. But I don't think it's a matter 
of law that they must conclude "A" or "B" or that they must --
MR. PROBERT: It isn't. It just gives them the 
option to make a decision about what weight they're going to 
give to it. 
THE COURT: I think it's a factual argument. 
MR. PROBERT: I think it's a question of weight that 
they should apply. 
THE COURT: Then they give it what weight they feel 
they want to give it. I don't think it requires a further 
instruction. 
MR. PROBERT: The other question I had was, I haven't 
had time to check this out against the instructions that you 
gave me because I didn't know there were familial witnesses 
going to be called today. But I did want to include an 
instruction in relation to bias. 
MR. CARTER: I thought the Court addressed that. 
THE COURT: I think that's in there. 
MR. PROBERT: I couldn't recall if it was. 
MR. CARTER: Page 20 of 25: You are the sole judges 
of all questions of fact, weight, and any of the testimony you 
may •• 
MR. PROBERT: That's fine. 
THE COURT: That's there. That's in the stocks. 
Anything else? 
MR. PROBERT: No. 
MR. CARTER: No. 
THE COURT: Let's take about five. Gather 
yourselves, and come back in. What we'll do is start with the 
question from the juror, then allow each of you to follow up 
on that with the officer. Then Mr. Carter can go ahead. 
(Brief recess is taken.) 
THE COURT: Officer, if I can have you come back up 
and take the stand. Apparently we have some questions. 
Counsel, come on up. 
(Bench conference is held.) 
THE COURT: Officer, three questions. 1*11 give you 
all three, allow you to respond and then allow the attorneys 
to follow up if they want. 
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